By: Climate Conflict Action | Published: August 21, 2025
Reading Time: 5 minutes
We are peacebuilding and development organizations that have consistently supported the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the creation of a more devolved and autonomous Bangsamoro region. We rejoiced when the CAB was signed in 2014, and when the Organic Law creating the BARMM was ratified in 2019.
From the signing of the CAB to its ratification, we stood shoulder to shoulder with the GPH and the MILF in countering public skepticism, thwarting legislative obstruction, and resisting private sector opposition to a peace process based on justice, human rights, and equitable development. Our shared efforts helped bestow political legitimacy to the peace process and rallied the international community to lend both moral and material support.
The citizens of the BARMM supported the CAB and ratified the BOL because of the promise, among others, that the MILF will transition into a social movement and political party ahead of the elections in May 2022. However, the transition of the MILF as an armed group to a social movement and the holding of the first BARMM elections are unfulfilled to date. While headway was gained in the political track of the peace process where BARMM’s political institutions, laws and bureaucracy were put in place under the MILF- led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), the decommissioning of the MILF combatants has been painstakingly slow, tentative, and fraught with red flags, including the repeated and unilateral suspension of planned decommissioning processes and targets. The delays in decommissioning have accompanied the delays in the regional elections from May 2022 to May 2025 then to October 2025.
The gains of the peace process are now threatened by an impasse in the decommissioning component of the CAB that will further impede the conflict-to-peace transition. Two weeks ago, and less than three months before the first parliamentary elections in the BARMM, the MILF declared another suspension in the weapons decommissioning aspect of the normalization component. Two days ago, the MILF
leadership called upon its troops and followers to avoid and reject any participation or involvement in any decommissioning or normalization discussion organized by the government and its relevant agencies.
• This turn of events sinks any hope of a peaceful parliamentary election in October, as the MILF and its political party the UBJP heads to the polls without having accomplished full decommissioning. Promises and assurances that guns will not be used to intimidate and harass opponents are dubious and unreliable.
• This impasse also renders the accompanying development programs in BARMM, especially the camp development project, at extreme risk of failure and/or capture. Worse, the situation will continue to disrupt economic certainty and
security, dampen investments, and prevent any hope of reining in the shadow economies in the BARMM.
• This fortuitous event bolsters a glaring truth that now stares everyone in the face— that peace in the South will remain extremely fragile. Hostile internal conditions will continue to persist and prevent the Armed Forces of the Philippines from refocusing its attention and resources to external threats that loom over the horizon.
Meanwhile, accusations of treachery and the betrayal of trust have become morefrequent in the past few days. We are aware that the MILF wants to connect the suspension of decommissioning over disagreement on the package of benefits for the decommissioned combatants. However, stalling the process over benefit claims rings hollow in the face of a huge block grant and continued access to special development funds that were allocated unilaterally to MILF combatants as well. This flawed logic would turn the normalization agreement into nothing more than a “money for weapons” deal. The decommissioned combatants must not be used as pawns in the high-stake political games of the elite.
The same holds true for the GPH. Settling political differences cannot be accomplished through organizational means. Political setbacks cannot be solved through organizational disruption, such as replacing the chief minister or changing accountability rules in mid-stream. Lest we forget, the same promises and commitments to transitional justice have yet to be delivered.
Nevertheless, we do not want to point the blame on anyone because we believe that the best and only way to break the impasse is to first acknowledge and accept the inherent weaknesses in the decommissioning and normalization processes and the peace bureaucracy that have long ignored these glaring problems.
The most important step that needs to be taken now is to conduct an inclusive examination of the entire peace infrastructure with other sectors and stakeholders having a seat on the table. Participation must be drawn from the peripheries to the center, from the islands to the cities, and from local to national.
There is absolutely no reason nor political legitimacy to a process where the GPH through OPAPRU and the MILF through the UBJP can exclude other stakeholders in deciding the future of the BARMM. Breaking the impasse will require a collective effort and a collective decision that includes other sectors such as the Moro clans and the non-Moro indigenous peoples. This ensures a fresh mandate and a new momentum for peace that endures beyond our lifetime.