Security Perspective | How Things Could Play Out in the South China Sea

By Col Dencio S. Acop (Ret), PhD  | Date 03-19-2024

MANILA – China has the ball rolling in its quest for regional hegemony in Asia. A thorn on the side of China in this massive undertaking is Taiwan which it considers to be a ‘renegade province’. The Chinese Communist Party believes China will never be seen as the undisputed regional hegemon if it cannot even attain ‘reunification’ with its estranged province. Much more aspire to become a credible challenger to the United States for global dominance.

Word is out that given China’s current strengths and weaknesses along with the opportunities and threats surrounding it, there is only a finite window of opportunity within which Beijing could achieve its objective. When will China make its move on Taiwan? And how will it make this move?

A paper written by Major Kyle Amonson and Captain Dane Egli estimates a possible offensive move by China on Taiwan between 2027 and 2030, the period both assess to be China’s window of opportunity.

The authors considered three factors in making their assessment. One is the current leader Xi Jinping’s persona. No Chinese leader since Mao Zedong has had both the charisma and ruthlessness than the current one. Since Xi came into power in 2012, China has accelerated its grand strategy to become a world leader. It is now in the third phase of that grand strategy in just over a few years. Beijing is now well on its way towards ‘offensively’ engaging the world after years of passivity and defensiveness.

Another factor considered by the authors is the People’s Liberation Army’s defense modernization as an enabling element. Xi has publicly ordered the PLA to be ready for action by 2027, its centenary year, and the completion date of its modernization goals.

The third factor considered is demographics – domestic election cycles and Xi’s life expectancy. At 70 years old, Xi is currently in his third term. In 2027, he will be 74 years old and on his fourth term presiding over the PLA’s centenary year and call to action. By then, the centenary year of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ in 2049 will still be over two decades hence with around 30% of the population already over 60 years old.

Professor Hal Brands writing for Bloomberg identifies five strategies China could adopt toward reunification with Taiwan on its way to regional hegemony. These courses of action, however, are not without their attendant costs to China despite their attractive benefits.

One strategy which has already been rolling and Xi’s preferred option is ‘coercion below the threshold of war’. This includes flying into Taiwan’s air space, crossing the center line of the Taiwan Strait, disinformation, cyberattacks, and diplomatically isolating Taiwan. It has waged psychological warfare on the Taiwanese population hoping to win enough numbers in favor of peaceful reunification.

Has this strategy worked? No, it hasn’t and perhaps its greatest illustration is the recent win by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-Te. Xi and the Communist Party have only themselves to blame for this debacle. Brands wrote that Chinese pressure over the years only managed to undermine the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang Party (KMT) and empowered the more hawkish, independence-minded DPP.

Beijing’s underhandedness since its 2019 ruthless crackdown in Hong Kong has been dwindling local Taiwanese support for peaceful reunification. It has achieved the opposite shifting the center of gravity in Taiwan politics in ways that make peaceful reunification most unlikely. In fact, Taiwanese identity among the local populace has grown stronger.

A second strategy could be for Beijing to seize one or two Taiwanese off-shore islands. The tiny islands of Kinmen and Matsu are only swimming distance away from the Chinese mainland. These islands were bombarded by Mao Zedong forces in the 1950s and would have been recovered from Taiwan had it not been for US intervention. If the two islands remained unseized by China, it would have been for good reason. They are not the objective — Taiwan is. The costs would have outweighed the benefits of crossing the threshold of war without delivering Taiwan.

A Blockade can be a third strategy. This would entail a physical quarantine of Taiwan enforced by PLA maritime and air power, aggressive customs inspections, off-port missile tests to scare away merchant vessels, and cyberattacks targeting economic and financial infrastructure.

But starving Taiwan by China will not be without its repercussions from the international community especially democratic allies like the US and Japan. This could include economic sanctions against China. The blockade will take time to have effect giving Taiwanese allies time to retaliate.

According to Brands, the “US would probably flood the western Pacific with attack submarines and otherwise position its forces exactly as it would want them arrayed if war broke out”. The US and allies could then force their way through the blockade to bring in supplies to Taiwan by water or air. Ultimately, China still risks a shooting war with Taiwan and its allies if it adopts this option.

A fourth possible strategy is Bombardment. China has the world’s largest ground-based missile force. It is assessed though that it will take more than this course of action to make Taiwan capitulate. Bombardment may only strengthen Taiwan’s resolve to hold out as it has already done so all these years and as Britain did during World War II against German air power. Like the preceding option, the protraction of bombardment will only manage to invite condemnation and subsequent intervention from the international community led by the United States.

The final option is the worst one possible: Invasion. Such will begin with massive air attacks against strategic targets (armed forces, key infrastructure), sabotage, and assassinations of leaders. The PLA will then try to seize beachheads, airfields, and ports to transport troops and supplies needed to occupy the island.

Meanwhile, the PLA Navy will try to block foreign intervention or support around the island. With this option, it would be absurd to discount US intervention. Beijing may need to hit US bases and forces nearby like those in Guam, Japan, and on aircraft carriers and submarines in the western Pacific. If there will soon be US forces in the Philippines and South Korea, they may be targeted too.

Taiwan is not an easy terrain to invade with its mountains, jungles, cities, and other terrain favorable to defense. There are more than 100 miles of rough seas to cross. An invasion would require some 100,000 troops to be air or sea-lifted into hostile territory while controlling the air and water spaces around it. For its part, Taiwan now has new, longer-range cruise missiles that can strike deep into China up to 930 miles.

Taiwan and the US can dramatically raise the costs of a Chinese invasion by turning the international waters of the Taiwan Strait into a death trap for attacking forces using hordes of missile launchers, armed drones, electronic jammers, smart mines, and sensors at sea and on allied territory near the strait. Bloomberg estimates that the economic cost of war over Taiwan will be some 10 trillion dollars.

Each of the summed-up strategic options has its attendant benefits and costs. But having said that, to date, it appears that costs to China and the world are much higher than weighed-in benefits as developments stand. There is also the danger that any of the options Beijing is playing, and can play, can lead to war if not handled properly. Xi has made it clear. China reserves the right to use whatever course of action is necessary to effect a reunification with Taiwan. That if a peaceful reunification fails, forceful action is implied. Whatever it may be, a Taiwan invasion would be costly, complicated, and protracted.