China’s latest maritime regulation has given its Coast Guard the power to apprehend ‘trespassers’ in the South China Sea, a move widely reported in international and local media.
The new regulation will take effect next month, detaining foreign fishermen – Filipino, Malaysians, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese – for up to two months without charges and even trial.
Beijing imposed the new maritime rules in response to a daring supply mission to Filipino fishermen around Bajo de Masinloc, internationally known as Scarborough Shoal, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, by a non-government group, Atin Ito.
China sent a large flotilla of Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels to block the five indigenous boats from carrying out its mission on May 15.
Chinese media spewed propaganda, accusing the Philippines of stoking tensions around Bajo de Masinloc, which Beijing had illegally seized in June 2012 after a three-month stand off with the Philippines.
China has an excessive claim in almost the entire South China Sea based on its unrecognized historical data. China also disregarded the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 international arbitration tribunal, which repudiated its nine-dash-line claim as baseless and illegal.
Thus, China violated international laws and used its might to impose its will on smaller and weaker coastal states.
If one is to follow China’s logic, Rome can, therefore, claim the entire areas in southern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea based on history.
However, China’s historical claims were extinguished when it signed the 1982 UNCLOS and ratified the treaty in 1996. UNCLOS is an international law signed by 168 countries, including the Philippines.
Under UNCLOS, China’s occupation of Bajo de Masinloc is illegal. It is beyond China’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
The rocky outcrop, which is only 125 nautical miles west of Zambales, is within the Philippines’ maritime zones, has jurisdiction, and is entitled to economic rights in the area.
Thus, China is rewriting the international maritime rules. It is reshaping the global marine regime.
There is no reasonable justification for China to control Bajo de Masinloc except by brute force to bully the Philippines into accepting the new status quo.
China is demonstrating the dictum might is right, ignoring rules-based international order.
China’s new maritime regulation could lead to only one thing: heightened regional tensions as Southeast Asian claimant states – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam – would not surrender their rights under UNCLOS.
There could be increasing friction, leading to accidents and a shooting war in the South China Sea.
The situation became more complicated as there were outside powers challenging China’s assertion.
The United States and its allies – Australia, Canada, India, Japan, and the European powers – have started patrolling the disputed waterway, further raising tensions.
Security analysts believe the South China Sea is a major regional flashpoint and the chances of a conflict erupting from the area is high.
In the past, China and Vietnam had a naval shootout near Fiery Cross Reef, which resulted in the sinking of a Vietnamese vessel and China’s takeover of the strategic reef.
China now occupies seven features, transforming them into virtual fortresses after building man-made islands.
Although there were some overlaps in the exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea, Southeast Asian states have agreed to put their differences in the backburner and agreed to cooperate in non-military activities, like search ad rescue operations, maritime pollution, and stopping transnational crimes.
The Philippines and Vietnam have been holding friendly volleyball and soccer matches in their occupied features.
When a Chinese commercial vessel rammed and sank a Filipino fishing boat, the crew was rescued by Vietnamese fishermen.
Before China illegally seized Bajo de Masinloc in 2012, Filipinos could freely fish in the calm waters inside the shoal’s lagoon, exchanging food, water, and cigarettes with Chinese, Malaysian, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese fishermen.
The friendly situation changed after 2012. Only Chinese fishermen were allowed inside the lagoon and other fishermen were driven 15 miles to 20 miles from the shoal.
Starting next month, non-Chinese fishermen face arrest even if they venture 15 miles from Bajo de Masinloc and within the Philippines’ 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zones.
Fishermen from other Southeast Asian states could face the same problem within their own maritime zones because of China’s arbitrary and unilateral maritime regulation.
Who can stop the Chinese Coast Guard from carrying out its mandate under the new maritime regulation?
China has the largest Coast Guard fleet in the world. It is quite easy for Beijing to enforce the new law, but smaller states would have difficulty protecting their own fishermen even within its own maritime zones.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr had said the new maritime regulation is “unacceptable.”
But how can Marcos prevent the Chinese Coast Guard from arresting Filipino fishermen even if they are within the country’s exclusive economic zone?
Can a strongly-worded diplomatic protest free Filipino fishermen in case they were detained?
How can the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states return to the pre-2012 status quo?
Building on its baseless nine-dash-line claim, China has started creating local maritime laws, like a fishing ban, and strengthening naval and maritime law enforcement apparatus. These actions challenge the sovereignty of other nations and undermine international naval law and norms, posing a significant threat to global maritime security.
China has been codifying its “law of the sea” outside UNCLOS. If the other claimant states start to accept China’s practices, and if other states start to acquiesce to China’s preferences, it could become international rules.
The Philippines and other Southeast Asian states must register their strong opposition to China’s domestic maritime laws.
Ignoring them could be tantamount to accepting the Chinese domestic laws. That could be dangerous. It could replace UNCLOS.